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K3 Capital Pauses sBOLD Contracts After Blockaid Reports $3.43M Drain

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Summary: Blockchain security firm Blockaid reported that attackers drained approximately $3.43 million from K3 Capital’s sBOLD vault via a flash loan exploit. K3 Capital has paused the contracts and launched an investigation, though the total loss may increase as the event remains ongoing.

Crypto editorial illustration by 3CBlock
Illustration: 3CBlock

Exploit Detected and Contracts Paused

Attackers have drained approximately $3.43 million from K3 Capital’s sBOLD vault, a yield-generating product built on the Liquity V2 lending protocol, according to an alert issued by blockchain security firm Blockaid. The alert was posted on X at 12:50 UTC on Wednesday, describing the exploit as “ongoing.” Blockaid noted that the reported figure covered roughly 34 transactions “so far,” indicating that the total financial impact could grow as more activity is identified.

In response to the security breach, K3 Capital issued a statement on X at 13:08 UTC, approximately 17 minutes after Blockaid’s initial warning. The company confirmed it was “investigating malicious activity involving sBOLD” and stated that the relevant smart contracts had been paused. K3 Capital did not provide a specific loss figure or identify the root cause of the vulnerability in its initial communication.

Transaction Details and Attack Vector

Forensic analysis by Blockaid highlighted specific on-chain activity linked to the exploit. One transaction flagged by the security firm was recorded on the Ethereum blockchain at 12:25 UTC, about 25 minutes before the public alert was issued. A review of the Etherscan record showed that this single transaction contained 231 separate token transfers, suggesting a complex series of automated operations designed to extract value from the protocol.

Blockaid outlined the mechanics of the attack, stating that the perpetrators first secured a flash loan in wstETH, which is Lido’s wrapped version of staked ether. A flash loan allows borrowers to access large amounts of capital without collateral, provided the funds are borrowed and repaid within the same transaction block. Using these borrowed funds, the attackers liquidated their own Liquity V2 trove, which is the protocol’s term for a borrowing position. This action sent the associated debt and collateral into the stability pools.

According to Blockaid, the attackers then used this manipulated state to “mint cheap sBOLD shares” and swap the collateral. Finally, they redeemed BOLD stablecoins that belonged to other depositors in the vault, effectively draining the pool of user funds. Blockaid’s follow-up posts included the addresses of one of the exploiter’s helper contracts and the drained vault itself.

sBOLD Structure and Previous Audits

sBOLD is an ERC-4626 compliant vault that allows users to deposit BOLD, Liquity V2’s dollar-pegged stablecoin. The vault automatically places these deposits into Liquity’s stability pools, which are reserves used to pay off the debt of loans being liquidated. In exchange, the vault receives the collateral from those loans. Liquity’s official blog describes sBOLD as a third-party project developed by K3 Capital, distinct from Liquity’s core protocol. Unlike the immutable contracts of Liquity V2, the sBOLD vault contains adjustable components, including its price oracle and the adapter used for token swaps.

The security of the vault had previously been assessed by ChainSecurity, which completed an audit on May 19, 2025. The audit summary explicitly stated that “the possibility of value extraction through self-liquidations has been mitigated.” It remains unclear whether the current attack exploited the same vector addressed in the audit or a different vulnerability. K3 Capital has not yet disclosed the specific cause of the breach or provided guidance to depositors regarding the recovery of funds.

The incident underscores the risks associated with third-party layers built on top of decentralized finance protocols. While the core Liquity V2 system is designed to be immutable and resistant to upgrades, integrations like sBOLD introduce mutable elements such as oracles and swap adapters. As the situation develops, the final tally of losses may exceed the initial $3.43 million estimate provided by Blockaid.